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By John W.
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d Lela

Angel and her brothers, Martin and Christophe, are engaged in the mediation of a will controversy, involving the estate of their

father. They are the only beneficiaries under the will. Five years before the testator's death, he had provided his grandchild
$50,000 for the down payment on a house. At the time of the payment, he had told his grandchild and Angel, the child's mother, that the money was a gift; nonetheless, he required his grandchild to sign a promissory note for the full amount, saying the
note was merely a formality to avoid gift taxes. Martin, the executor of the estate, found the promissory note among the testator's papers and has deducted the full amount due on the note, plus interest, from Angel's one-third share of the estate, giving
her the note so that she can choose to collect it or not from her own daughter. Angel vehemently objected to her unequal share
and to the characterization of the payment as a loan. After a heated discussion, the parties ask the mediator for his or her opinion on how the matter would be resolved in court. Both Angel and Martin feel sure they will be vindicated by the mediator;
Christophe wants the mediator's opinion to guide his own conduct. What should a mediator do, assuming he or she is competent to give the sort of opinion that is being asked for?

A

nyone who dares to explore the field of informed
consent in alternative dispute resolution quickly
comes to appreciate the quagmire of differing expert
viewpoints; of conflicting or silent codes of conduct,
statutes, and rules; of divergent definitions of processes;
and of the complexity of the topic generally. This article
explores only one facet of informed consent: what principles guide a mediator in responsibly performing the duty
of ensuring that parties give their informed consent prior
to a mediator providing an opinion on the merits of a
question once a mediation is underway. If the mediator
was chosen because he or she would provide an op inion
(a former judge, for example) or the parties contracted for
evaluative mediation, then the analysis here would not
apply. This article focuses on a mediator giving an evaluation when that was not an agreed-upon service when the
mediation began. A similar analysis shou ld be applied to

any neutral performing a "new" service that is importantly
different from what was expected: an arbitrator, for example, who takes on mediation services. There are dangers, in
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every case, in changing horses midstream. Both as a matter of responsible practice and to avoid liability, those
dangers best be known and consciously accepted prior to
undertaking the move.
In articulating principles and guidelines, we will have
to answer: What are the dangers of providing an opinion
or case evaluation while serving as a mediator? If there
are dangers, what duties does a mediator have to warn
parties? What should be said? What is informed consent
in this context? Additionally, once consent is given, how
careful must a mediator be in providing an opinion or
professional advice?
Before proceeding, we should define what we mean by
mediator evaluation that would merit warning and informed
consent. We do not mean reality-testing questions (e.g.,

Have you considered getting legal advice about deducting the
value of the note from Angel's share of the estate? How do you
think a judge might view a signed
note compared to a recollection of a
verbal statement?). Nor do we
include mediator role-reversal
strategies to ensure that parties
understand one another's perspectives and arguments (e.g., Did you

understand Angel's point about honoring the representations and intentions of your father? Do you
appreciate that Martin is more persuaded by a signed note than by your
report about a statement made many
years ago?) Despite an evaluative

The Dangers of Mediator Evaluations
The benefits of a neutral (particularly expert) evaluation
may be more intuitively obvious than the dangers. The
benefits, from a party's perspective, might include enhancing
the information base for decision making; reality-checking the overconfidence of the other side; using the trusted
neutral mediator instead of needing to hire another neutral for an evaluation; and bringing public norms ( the
law) into the conversation to provide an acceptable basis
for a resolution.
Those possible benefits must be weighed, however,
against dangers that may not be as obvious, particularly
to inexperienced parties. Unsolicited opinions often provoke defensive, even hostile,
reactions, particularly if the opinion is unfavorable. Even solicited
opinions can be unwelcome if
they importantly differ from what
is expected. Consider the following list of potential dangers in
mediator evaluation:

Unsolicited opinions
often provoke
defensive, even
hostile, reactions,
particularly if the
opinion is unfavorable.

component in these questions, the
questions call for party evaluation.
If the mediator's tone is consistent
with that call-as opposed to a
tone that asserts a mediator's conclusion-such questions do not
comprise mediator evaluation as
the term is used here. A facilitative mediator regularly asks for party analysis about applicable law, leads a discussion about the strengths and
weaknesses of their cases, and probes for alternatives and
options. Examples of evaluative mediator behavior that
would require informed consent include:
• Advising parties about their legal rights and responsibilities by applying legal rules and precedents to the specific facts of the dispute. (E.g., Angel is not liable on her
adult daughter's promissory note. The testator's granddaughter
will probably be found liable on the written promissory note
despite parole evidence to the contrary.)
• Offering a personal or professional opinion on how the
court will resolve the dispute. (E.g., You will not win this
case in court. You have a very slim chance of prevailing with
that argument. )

In these examples, the mediator is stepping into the
decisional role of a neutral expert. While this article
focuses on legal opinions, the same analysis would apply
/
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to other situations. For example, if the mediator comes
from a different professional background (e.g., psychology,
accounting), rendering evaluations based on expert
knowledge would require the same treatment.
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• An evaluation might jeopardize
the actual or perceived neutrality
of the mediator, which in tum
jeopardizes a mediator's continued
usefulness;
• An evaluation might interfere
with party self-determination (insofar as parties bow to a neutral's
expertise and opinion rather than
exercising their own judgment),
detracting from the focus on party
responsibility for critical analysis
and creative problem-solving;

• An evaluation made on the basis
of incomplete or limited information or based on inadequate
research can be highly speculative and more likely wrong
compared to an evaluation of a neutral specifically hired for
that purpose; even if the evaluator is right, a subsequent
arbitrator, judge or jury may not reach the same conclusion;
• Evaluation focuses the outcome on the criteria used by
a third party (e.g., legal norms) when other norms-such
as family or religious values-may be more important to
the parties;
• An evaluation based in some part on information
obtained in caucuses, without the opportunity for rebuttal
by the other side, rests on inferior-or at least differentevidence than the evidence that an arbitrator, judge, or
jury would have;
• An evaluation may end negotiations by polarizing the
parties and entrenching their positions, in effect prolonging rather than shortening disputes where the party
favored by the evaluation becomes more entrenched and
the disfavored party loses confidence in the mediator;

/

• An anticipated evaluation will importantly affect mediation representation and party negotiation, making it less
likely that parties will be candid with one another and
the mediator.

In light of these dangers, one might imagine a mediator's opinion that disfavored Angel or her daughter, for
example, ending negotiations, perhaps further damaging
the already fragile family, and leading to litigation costs
for the estate and parties that might exceed the $50,000
that Angel, Martin, and Christophe are arguing about.
The Mediator's Duty to Warn and
Informed Consent
These significant dangers suggest a duty to warn. Under
both torts and contract theories, a mediator's failure to warn
might be actionable. In torts, the parties' reasonable expectation that the mediator will not change the agreed-upon or
expected process absent meaningful disclosure and consent
arguably creates a duty to warn. Negligence or malpractice
liability could arise from a breach of this duty where there
are damaging repercussions on the disputants' lives. Under
contract theory, a failure to warn about a change in the
agreed-upon process and its potential repercussions and to
gain party consent might be a breach of either an express or
implied term in the mediation contract.
With respect to a party's informed understanding of
what evaluation by a mediator means, informed consent
is a relatively straightforward concept. Simply put, parties
are entitled to understand what they are requesting, or
what is being proposed by the mediator, and to be forewarned of dangers they might face prior to their consenting to the mediator's provision of an evaluation. Once
adequately warned, parties are deemed to have assumed
the risk voluntarily if they consent and hence be responsible for the consequences of their choice.
What, then, constitutes consent to engage in an evaluative process? Any definition of informed consent should
be carefully crafted to describe the precise scope of the
consent to an evaluative process. At a minimum, a party's
consent should cover elements that current mediation
court rules generally require when an evaluation is contemplated, requested, or proffered. The scope of a party's
consent should encompass a freely made, voluntary decision: ( 1) to participate in a specific type of evaluative
process based on a clear understanding of the benefits,
limitations, and risks associated with the process; (2) to
be satisfied with the specifically described role of the neutral and the neutral's related ethical responsibilities in the
evaluative process; and (3) to be satisfied with the nature
and amount of any additional fees and costs charged by
the neutral in conducting the evaluative process.
Principles for Adequate Disclosure
So we arrive back at the questions: What principles guide
mediators in providing parties with information relevant
to the parties' consent to a mediator's changing role?
When must a mediator obtain consent to step near (or
over) the line into a decisional, evaluative role into what

.

Responding to a Request
for an Evaluation
ou have asked me to give an opinion on the
likely court outcome of this matter, and I am
willing to do that if you both agree to my providing that service. However, you should understand that at least one of you may not like my
opinion and may feel I am no longer impartial. If
that happens, I may be unable to assist you further
or may be less effective as a mediator. Also, particularly if you think my opinion is wrong, you may be
disadvantaged by it in subsequent negotiations.
While I will do my best to give you a thoughtful
opinion, you should understand I might be wrongdifferent lawyers come to different conclusionsand my analysis will be based on information that is
different from what a judge, arbitrator, or jury would
hear. While I have practiced in the area of trusts
and estates, I do not consider myself a specialist.
Also, my opinion will be based on more limited evidence than the evidence available in adjudication,
since you have not completed discovery. In addition,
because I have learned information in caucus and
from confidential submissions that you have not
heard or seen and hence cannot rebut, you must rely
on me to separate that out from information I hear in
joint session.
In any case, it is very speculative to predict what
a particular judge might do. I advise you to listen to
your own counsel (or to get legal counsel) to inform
you and protect your legal rights.
Also, to the degree we focus on legal rights and
the likely court outcome, it may distract you from
looking for more creative solutions that might serve
your interests better. This situation involves three
generations of your family, and your family's values
might be a more important basis for decisions than
the likely legal outcome.
Are you sure you want me to give an evaluation?

Y

has become known as "evaluative mediation"?

No Surprises
No one likes bad surprises. When expectations are lowered by thoughtful warnings, one tends to appreciate what
is provided and take precautions against what might cause
problems. Furthermore, disclosure and consent pass the
burden of responsibility to the person who assumes the
risk. Adequate warning will enhance a mediator's credibility in that candor, and disclosure gamers trust. In addition, accurate expectations will allow attorneys to prepare
appropriate representation plans and allow clients to
make appropriate disclosures.
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A Clear Description
Any warning must indicate, with precision, the service
being proffered and the various dangers to the mediation
that are entailed. A mediator who begins in a facilitative
mode and subsequently agrees to provide an evaluation
might obtain informed consent by a statement similar
to the boxed statement. (See Sidebar, "Responding to
a Request for an Evaluation.")
Early Warning
Because the caucus strategy of the mediator, the advocacy
approach of any attorneys, and the willingness to share
certain types of information of parties may depend on
their expectations regarding the role of the neutral, that
role should be clarified at the earliest point possible.
Often, however, it is at "final" impasse that mediators offer
an evaluation as a last-resort impasse-breaking device. If the
evaluation was not anticipated, then the mediator would
simply give appropriate warnings before the evaluation is
made-as early as possible under these circumstances.
Two points need to be made about "final" impasse. First,
it's not over until it's over. Determining what constitutes final
impasse is a tricky-and perhaps illusory-affair. Parties can
always recommence negotiations and mediation after a particular ses.sion fails to achieve resolution. Consequently, the
warnings are in order despite the feeling that the mediator
may not be needed again. Second, parties frequently want an
evaluation because they believe it will be favorable to them.
Attorneys want an evaluation because they believe it will
make their clients more flexible or will benefit their clients.
Evaluations, however, are likely to disappoint one (or sometimes all) of the players. Parties need clear, accurate, and reasonable expectations or a disservice can be rendered. A
mediator does not want the final act, if it is the final act, of
the mediation to do harm.

Standard of Care in Providing Opinions
How careful must a mediator be in providing an opinion or
professional advice? If there is general disagreement and
confusion about the required scope and content of informed
consent relative to mediator evaluation, the question of
what standard of care applies to the evaluation mirrors that
disagreement and confusion. Some of the various theories
that apply to informed consent are relevant to the degree of
care that must be exercised in providing an evaluation.
These include tort and contract law, as discussed above.
Under any theory, one would expect the provision of an
opinion to be done with care. Negligence law would apply a
"reasonableness" standard. Contract law would ask about
the agreement or reasonable expectation of the parties. We
add to these points some principles:
• Always provide the basis and context of the evaluation.
What information will the evaluation be based upon?
What expertise does the mediator have? What research is
being undertaken?
• Always urge parties to get independent evaluations, listen to their own lawyers (if applicable), and consult their
own judgment.

.'
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• Go to the library or its electronic equivalent. That is,
base the evaluation on a mode of thinking and conduct
that an evaluator or opinion-giver would engage in. No
lawyer, for example, should give an off-the-cuff opinion
without research unless he identifies it as such and warns
about its potential fallibility.

For Angel, Martin, and Christophe, the evaluation and
its quality might have a dramatic impact on their relationships going forward. Their sense of entitlement, their
ability to live with or be influenced by a certain conclusion, and their confidence in the neutral providing the
opinion will all depend on the care that is displayed in
the rendering of the evaluation.

Minimizing the Risks of Evaluation
Evaluation can be a risky move, and mediators should, as a
baseline, do no harm in their practice. They should fosterand not undermine-party self-determination. Ensuring
informed consent for mediator evaluation both minimizes
the possibility of harm and maximizes the pos.sibility of selfdetermination. Put another way, parties should have a
meaningful choice regarding whether their mediator uses
the tool of opinion-giving and should be aware of the dangers involved when they make that choice.
When mediators do provide requested opinions, they
should do so with care. They should consider what information they are basing their opinion on. Is some of the "evidence" unreliable? That is, was it offered in a caucus where
the other side had no opportunity to respond? Opinions
based on such information are more likely to be unfair.
Mediators should, metaphorically speaking, "go to the
library" before giving advice. They should review, take time,
and consult professional resources that would normally be
double-checked before a professional opinion is provided. At
the very least, the parties should understand what the decision is based on and its qualitative difference from an opinion a judge, arbitrator, or neutral expert would make.
Ideally, Angel, Martin, and Christophe-and other parties in mediation-will come away from the mediation
process with a better understanding of one another and of
the values that each brings to the dispute. They will feel
that their expectations regarding the mediation process
were honored and that the outcome of the process is a result
of decisions that each freely made. If they requested a mediator evaluation, they will have no regrets because they
understood the downside of that process before the evaluation. In short, they will have given informed consent based
on adequate disclosures, and the evaluation will enhance,
rather than compromise, party self-determination. •

Note: This article is a condensed version of an article
that appeared in the Ohio State Journal of Dispute
Resolution in 2005: Lela P. Love and John W. Cooley,

The Intersection of Evaluation by Mediators and Informed
Consent: Warning the Unwary, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 45 (2005).

